Background The novel infl uenza A H7N9 virus emerged recently in mainland China, whereas the infl uenza A H5N1 virus has infected people in China since 2003. Both infections are thought to be mainly zoonotic. We aimed to compare the epidemiological characteristics of the complete series of laboratory-confi rmed cases of both viruses in mainland China so far.
Introduction
Since Feb 19, 2013 , when the fi rst patient infected with the novel infl uenza A H7N9 virus from an avian source showed symptoms, 131 laboratory-confi rmed cases have been reported in mainland China as of June 9, 2013 . This virus seems to exhibit low pathogenicity in birds, 1 by contrast with the severe disease that occurs in human beings. 2 Such divergent interspecies presentation diff ers from infl uenza A H5N1, another infl uenza virus of direct avian origin, which is highly pathogenic in both human beings and birds. 3 Another immediately notable feature of H7N9 is the rapid accumulation of laboratory-confi rmed cases of infection in human beings, even though phylogenetic 4 and epidemiological 5, 6 evidence suggests that transmission is mainly zoonotic. By contrast, H5N1, similarly an exclusive zoonosis with very few exceptions, has caused only 43 laboratory-confi rmed cases of infection in human beings since the symptom onset date of Nov 25, 2003 , in the fi rst patient in mainland China.
To improve our understanding of these diff erent viral characteristics and to inform public health control measures for both co-circulating viruses, we aimed to compare key epidemiological variables of the complete series of laboratory-confi rmed human cases of infl uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 in mainland China so far.
Methods

Participants
In China, all laboratory-confi rmed cases of infection with H7N9 and of H5N1 are reported to the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) through a national system for reporting of notifi able infectious diseases. Case defi nitions, surveillance for identifi cation of H7N9 and H5N1 cases, and laboratory test assays are described in previous reports. [6] [7] [8] [9] A joint fi eld investigation team comprising staff from local or provincial CDC, the China CDC, or both did fi eld investigations of the laboratory-confi rmed cases of H7N9 infection. All patients with confi rmed H5N1 infection were inter viewed by a trained team from the China CDC, except for two military cases. Demographic, epidemi ological, and basic clinical data for patients infected with H7N9 and H5N1 were collected on standardised forms. Investi gations were generally started within 24 h of diagnosis of suspected infection, clinical cir cum stances permitting.
China CDC constructed an integrated database, with detailed epidemiological information about each occurrence of laboratory-confi rmed H7N9 and H5N1 reported to them by May 24, 2013 . Information used in the present analysis included the age, sex, place of residence, number and type of contacts traced, symptoms at illness onset, and underlying medical disorders associated with an increased risk of infl uenza complications; 10 dates of illness onset, hospital admission, death or discharge; and dates of potential exposures to domestic or retail animals and visits to live poultry markets.
The National Health and Family Planning Commission decided that the collection of data from cases of both H5N1 and H7N9 was part of an ongoing public health investigation of an emerging outbreak and thus was exempt from institutional review board assessment.
Statistical analysis
We plotted the geographical locations of cases of H5N1 and H7N9, and did descriptive analyses of the dates of illness onset and the characteristics of the patients. We analysed the number and type of contacts traced for each patient by type of case and exposure history. Close contacts were defi ned as people known to have been within 1 m of, or to have had direct contact with the respiratory secretions or faecal material of, a patient with laboratory-confi rmed H7N9 or H5N1 infection any time from the day before the onset of illness to when the patient was isolated in the hospital or died. 6, 11 We used survival analysis techniques to estimate time-delay distributions, including the incubation period (infection to illness onset), illness onset to admission, illness onset to laboratory confi rmation, hospital admission to death, and hospital admission to discharge. 12, 13 We com pared alternative parametric distributions, includ ing gamma, Weibull, and lognormal distributions, with non-parametric estimates, and selected the best parametric distribution on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. 14 Patients with confi rmed infection and their relatives were interviewed to ascertain exposure histories to poultry and swine, and environmental exposures, during the 14 days before illness onset. 6, 15, 16 We estimated the incubation period on the basis of dates of reported close contact with live poultry as the proxy for infection, and in sensitivity analyses we explored estimates based on reported exposures to any live animals, and on reported visits to live poultry markets (thus accounting for the possibility of infection by environmental con tamination). Information about potential exposures was typically gathered for each of the preceding 14 days, but some cases had repeated exposures and our analysis explicitly allowed for the interval censoring in the exposure data.
14 In this analysis, we did not include patients who reported recent live poultry exposure but could not recall the exact dates.
Although the case-fatality risk (ie, the risk of death among cases 17 ) is commonly used as an important measure of the severity of infection, the estimated case-fatality risk can be highly dependent on the defi nition of a case and might sometimes be misinterpreted. Instead, we chose to investigate the fatality risk of patients admitted to hospital, for two reasons. First, mild infections of both H7N9 and H5N1 are less likely to have been detected than serious cases and therefore the risk of death among medically attended and laboratory-confi rmed cases would be diff erent, potentially by several orders of magnitude, to the symptomatic case-fatality risk (ie, the risk of death in symptomatic cases of H7N9 and H5N1 virus infections). Second, mild cases identifi ed through sentinel infl uenza-like illness surveillance or contact tracing should have a substantially lower risk of mortality than serious cases admitted with pneumonia, and one estimated case-fatality risk would misrepresent this heterogeneity. We therefore estimated the fatality risk for patients admitted to hospital with use of a non-parametric approach that accounted for the competing risks of death or discharge, and rightcensoring of the outcomes of patients still in hospital. 18 We estimated 95% CIs for the fatality risk for patients admitted to hospital with bootstrap estimates of the asymptotic variance with 1000 replications. 18, 19 All statistical analyses were done with R version 3.0.1.
Role of the funding source
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, writing of the report, or the decision to publish. BJC and HY had complete access to the data; the corresponding authors had fi nal responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
The delta in eastern China, with the most recent cases detected away from the initial epicentre to the south and north (fi gure 1). 93 cases (72%) of infection with H7N9 were in residents of urban areas. By contrast, the incidence rate of cases of infection with H5N1 peaked in 2006, and 24 cases (56%) were in rural residents (fi gures 1 and 2A). 33 cases (77%) of infection with H5N1 occurred in the winter months (November-February; fi gure 2B). Incidence of H7N9 peaked in early April, 2013 (fi gure 2C). A notable diff erence was recorded in the age and sex distributions of patients overall and by location of residence (fi gure 3). In urban areas, the viruses were more common in men-the male-to-female ratio for H7N9 was 2·9:1 and for H5N1 was 2·8:1. In rural areas, the male-to-female ratio was 1·6:1 for H7N9 and 0·5:1 for H5N1. Whereas more than half (71 of 130, 55%) of the cases of infection with H7N9 were in people aged 60 years or older (median age 62 years), H5N1 occurred mainly in young adults (fi gure 3 and table 1). Data are median (IQR), n (%), or n/N (%). *Only underlying medical disorders associated with a high risk for infl uenza complications 10 were counted here, including chronic respiratory disease, asthma, chronic cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic liver disease, chronic kidney disease, immunosuppressed status, and neuromuscular disorders. More than two-thirds of patients reported recent exposure to poultry for both H7N9 and H5N1 (table 1) , most often through visits to a live poultry market (for H7N9) or exposure to sick or dead poultry or to backyard poultry (for H5N1). Symptoms at illness onset were similar between the two viruses, with fever and cough the most commonly reported symptoms, albeit less often for H5N1 (table 2) . The mean number of contacts traced for each patient was much greater for H5N1 than for H7N9 (table 3) . For patients infected with H7N9, 2554 close contacts were reported, all of whom were traced-almost half were health-care-associated contacts. 21 contacts developed acute fever or respiratory symptoms during the medical surveillance period of 7 days after last exposure, without appropriate personal protective equipment, to patients infected with H7N9. Close contacts who developed febrile respiratory illness were transferred to a designated hospital for diagnosis and treatment, and respiratory specimens, paired sera, or both, were collected for laboratory analysis. Four of the ill contacts were laboratory confi rmed as cases of infection with H7N9. The mean number of contacts traced for patients infected with H7N9 was higher for urban (21·0) than for rural (18·3) residents (table 3) .
Information about dates of recent exposures to live poultry was available for 32 patients (25%) infected with H7N9, and for 27 (63%) infected with H5N1. Weibull models had the best fi t to the incubation period distributions for H7N9 and H5N1. We estimated the mean incubation period for H7N9 to be 3·1 days (95% CI 2·6-3·6, SD 1·4 days, 95th percentile 5·5 days). For H5N1, we estimated the mean incubation period to be 3·3 days (95% CI 2·7-3·9, SD 1·5 days, 95th percentile 6·0 days; fi gure 4A). In sensitivity analyses, estimated incubation period distributions for H7N9 and H5N1 based on contact with any live animals or visits to live poultry markets were very similar (data not shown).
The onset-to-admission interval was also similar for the two viruses (fi gure 4B): for 123 patients infected with H7N9, the median interval was estimated to be 4·2 days (95% CI 3·7-4·9) based on the best-fi tting gamma distribution, whereas for all 43 patients infected with H5N1 the median was estimated to be 4·9 days (3·9-5·9) based on the best-fi tting Weibull distri bu tion. For the onset to laboratory confi rmation delays, lognormal models fi tted best, and the distributions were similar for the two viruses (fi gure 4C). For H7N9, the median onset to laboratory confi rmation delay was 8·3 days (95% CI 7·3-9·5), and for H5N1 the median was 10·7 days (9·1-12·7).
We estimated the fatality risks for patients admitted to hospital, excluding seven patients infected with H7N9 classifi ed as mild and allowing for unresolved outcomes in 17 patients with H7N9 who are still in hospital. 19 In 123 patients admitted to hospital with H7N9 and the 43 admitted with H5N1, we estimated respective fatality risks for patients admitted to hospital to be 36% (95% CI 26-45) and 70% (56-83), respectively. Almost all laboratory-confi rmed infections with H5N1 had resulted in recovery or death within 3-4 weeks of admission, but duration of hospital stay was typically longer for patients infected with H7N9 than for those infected with H5N1 (fi gures 4D and 4E). The median time from hospital admission to death for patients infected with H7N9 was 12·0 days, compared with 5·7 days for patients infected with H5N1 based on best-fi tting lognormal distributions (fi gure 4D Types of exposure were ordered by risk level and categorised to be mutually exclusive by exclusion of overlapping cases with raised risk of exposure. Imputation of missing data was done by assuming the same ratio between health-care contacts and other contacts in the same category.*Other contacts include family and community contacts. †Exposure to poultry elsewhere includes exposure to backyard poultry. admission to discharge was 41·7 days for those infected with H7N9, whereas it was 18·7 days for patients infected with H5N1 based on best-fi tting Weibull distributions (fi gure 4E).
Discussion
We present the comparative epidemiology of human infl uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 virus infections in China. Although both viruses are of avian origin, and neither has yet acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human transmission, diff erences exist in their epidemiology. 20 Whereas most patients with confi rmed H7N9 and H5N1 infection reported exposure to live poultry (table 1) , the type of exposure was very diff erent in urban and rural locations. Figure 3 illustrates this fi nding clearly, since the male-to-female ratio is much higher in urban than in rural areas for both viruses. This result is consistent with sex-based diff erences in exposure, rather than diff erences in immunity (panel). In particular, the male-to-female ratio is highest for cases in Shanghai compared with other urban areas (data not shown); anecdotally, Shanghai is the Chinese city where men, rather than women, tend to have the most frequent retail exposures to live poultry. 26 Our deduction has at least prima-facie validity in that the age distribution of urban patients infected with H7N9 is consistent with increasing exposure to retail poultry with advancing age. 27, 28 Whereas some of the cases of H5N1 in rural areas have occurred in regions with low population density and were associated with exposure to backyard live poultry or handling of slaughtered poultry, 29 most of the rural cases of H7N9 were in people who live on the outskirts of urban areas and were exposed to retail poultry in live poultry markets; few such patients infected with H7N9 were exposed to backyard poultry (table 1) . The preponderance of women among the rural cases of H5N1 might be due to greater exposures to rearing, slaughtering, and cooking of backyard poultry. 7 The characteristics of patients infected with H5N1 in China were similar to patients infected with H5N1 in other countries in the region (table 4) .
The estimated mean incubation period for H7N9 of about 3 days is much lower than that previously reported, 6 which prompted public health authorities to extend the period of medical surveillance for close contacts of confi rmed cases from 1 week initially to 10 days now. [31] [32] [33] Of note, the present fi ndings concur with those estimated by an entirely diff erent method based on inference from the time series of cases (Yu H, Cowling BJ, Wu JT, et al, unpublished). The clarifi cation of the incubation period distribution has important implications. Existing case defi nitions should be updated, since incubation periods as long as 8-10 days are very unlikely. Quarantine or medical surveillance for close contacts need not last longer than 1 week, since more than 95% of patients would present within 7 days of infection. Accurate estimates of the incubation period distribution can help estimation of epidemic potential in case an avian infl uenza virus emerges that is effi ciently transmissible in humans.
Substantial interest has developed in the case-fatality risk associated with infl uenza A H7N9 virus infection. Because estimates of the laboratory-confi rmed casefatality risk can be misinterpreted as estimates of the symptomatic case-fatality risk, although they diff er substantially, we focused on the risk of death among patients admitted to hospital. 19 We found this fatality risk to be about 36% for H7N9-which is much lower than that for H5N1. The fatality risk on hospital admission of 70% for H5N1 was similar to other reports from the region, except for Vietnam (table 4) , [21] [22] [23] [24] 28, 30, 34, 35 and higher than estimates from Egypt, perhaps because of diff er ences in the viral clade or variations in speed of hospital admissions and levels of care. 25, 35 The longer average duration of hospital stay for patients with H7N9 before death (fi gure 4) might represent advances in medical care that can sustain life for longer, but also suggests slower disease progression. However, we did not analyse detailed clinical information in this report, since a separate nationally based eff ort is already underway. The present relatively long onset to admission intervals (median 4·2 days) and onset to laboratory confi rmation intervals (median 8·3 days) for H7N9 (fi gures 4B and 4C) could be reduced to permit more timely, and thus more eff ective, treatment with antivirals. 22, 34 If preliminary testing can show infl uenza A virus infection, either by rapid point-of-care tests or by RT-PCR, this could allow early antiviral treatment before the subtype is known.
The authorities have traced more than 2554 close contacts of patients so far, with only four potential secondary infections detected, and those four specifi c clusters could either be a result of low human-to-human transmission or a common source of infection. 6 The high average number of contacts traced for each case (table 3) , especially for patients infected with H5N1 who tended to be younger and therefore had more household and community contacts and care involving several hospitals and large medical teams, highlights the potential diffi culty that would be faced in a future outbreak of an avian infl uenza virus that is more transmissible between humans. The higher mean number of contacts for urban than for rural residents is indicative of the increased connectivity associated with urban living and the large medical teams found in tertiary referral hospitals in major cities.
Our analyses have several limitations. First, we have compared laboratory-confi rmed cases of infection with H7N9 and H5N1, and some cases of infection might not have been ascertained, particularly those that occurred early in the epidemics, because, for example, of no access to laboratory testing in some areas. Almost all patients with laboratory-confi rmed H7N9 infection had serious illness, including pneumonia, and all patients infected with H5N1 had pneumonia. Laboratory confi rmation of a few patients infected with H7N9 with mild to moderate disease suggests a greater number of mild to moderate cases. 8, 19, 28 Additionally, as of May 24, 2013, 17 patients with H7N9 are still in hospital, and the present H7N9 outbreak might not have ended yet, which could lead to some bias in the follow-up data. Second, our estimates of the incubation period are based on a subset of 32 patients with information about single or repeated exposures, whereas accurate and complete information for exposures can be diffi cult to ascertain. The absence of exposure data for some patients could have caused bias in the estimates of the incubation period distribution.
Our estimates of biological variables, such as the incubation period and to some extent the fatality risk on admission to hospital, should be applicable to other countries. Other variables, such as the onset to hospital admission delay and the onset to laboratory confi rmation delay, could also depend on health services and surveillance capacity, whereas the age and sex distribution of cases would also depend on patterns in exposure that could diff er in other locations.
In conclusion, we have reported estimates of important epidemiological variables and distributions of infl uenza A H7N9. However, many important questions remain. The diff erences in age distribution of patients with laboratory-confi rmed infection with H7N9 and H5N1 are intriguing; presumably, immunity associated with diff erent histories of infl uenza virus exposures has an important role in addition to diff erences in exposure patterns. Although we have reported the fatality risk for patients admitted to hospital, the symptomatic case-fatality risk remains to be established and a large portion of the "clinical iceberg" of infection might have remained undetected so far. The warm season has now begun in [22] [23] [24] [25] Preliminary reports of H7N9 epidemiology included three hypotheses for the increased incidence rate of laboratory-confi rmed H7N9 in men compared with women: greater risk of exposure in men, worse prognosis for infected men than infected women, and va rying health-seeking behaviours.
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Interpretation
Our study showed that the higher incidence rate of cases of H7N9 infection in men than in women was more apparent in urban than in rural areas, and the increased risk for men was also recorded for H5N1 in urban areas (fi gure 3). This fi nding is more consistent with exposure playing a major part in the risk of infection, although we cannot rule out the possibility of diff erences in immunity or health-care-seeking behaviours. Most cases of both viruses reported recent exposure to poultry (table 1) and good evidence suggests low human-to-human transmissibility in view of extensive contact tracing eff orts and very few potential secondary cases identifi ed. Some of the epidemiological variables were similar for both viruses (fi gure 4 A-C), whereas patients infected with H5N1 admitted to hospital had a higher risk of death (70% vs 36%) and more rapid disease progression than patients infected with H7N9 (fi gure 4D). In view of the seasonal pattern in human infections with infl uenza A H5N1 virus in China (fi gure 2B), we must be prepared for H7N9 to reappear later this year.
